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Many of us professional philosophers are familiar with books and articles that discuss the various moral judgements that people supposedly make every day.  We typically play around with declarations and thoughts such as ‘He is kind’, ‘She is wicked’, ‘This war is just’, and ‘That was a cruel action’.  I have written about, manipulated, and reflected on such judgements myself, as have many readers of this review I presume.  Often we take these judgements as our basic resource, probably in all innocence, and move on to develop whatever important thoughts we do.  But, on the face of it, although such judgements might be familiar, we might worry that such stock phrases do not exhaust by any means the moral thinking and sentiments of most people.  We might imagine that their – our – everyday moral judgements and imagination are more sophisticated than that.  But, what might these more sophisticated judgments look like?  Certainly we might imagine that many thick concepts are employed, as well as thin ones.  We might also imagine that we categorize people and other things with judgements that have nuanced clauses.  So, not just ‘He is kind’, but ‘He is kind, although he often lacks self-confidence and so his kindness can appear clumsy’.  There might well be other such changes and adaptations we can imagine to such thoughts and claims.  However, there is an important assumption underlying all of this made, perhaps, by many different types of contemporary theorist.  The assumption is that moral judgement and thought is confined simply to those judgements that employ straightforwardly obvious moral concepts such as goodness, kindness, cruelty, and all the rest.  Such concepts might be important, certainly, but they might not be the be all and end all.  Perhaps our moral life finds expression beyond these overtly moral concepts.  And perhaps this shift in our thinking might lead to interesting thoughts regarding some contemporary philosophical debates.         
	This briefly expressed train of thought is the main idea of Alice Crary’s stimulating and engaging new book.  As she says on p. 11, “My overarching thesis in this book is that our habits of moral thought and action need to reflect [a] reorientation if we are to do justice to challenges that we confront in trying to overcome limitations of our own moral understanding and in trying to negotiate moral differences that separate us from others.”  In putting forward her thesis she draws on J. L. Austin, Cora Diamond, John McDowell, and Wittgenstein, amongst others, as well as Jane Austen, Theodor Fontane, E. M. Forster, Henry James, and Tolstoy.  In advancing her view, Crary is not content simply to challenge the supposedly widespread assumption from above that moral thought is exhausted by thinking in terms dictated solely by concepts that are obviously moral.  She wishes to build to why this is an important question to ask and explore the various assumptions that feed into the view that she casts as both widespread and mistaken. 




Crary begins by thinking about J. L. Mackie’s familiar charge that objective prescriptions are queer and she briefly surveys the currently popular responses.  She uses this debate to initiate thoughts about the conception of objectivity that we should adopt in our moral thought.  In effect, she defends a view familiar from the writings of certain sensibility theorists, such as McDowell, that the conception of objectivity that is appropriate to use in relation to moral discourse and thought is one that in some way encompasses seemingly problematic subjective types of phenomenon, something that a ‘narrower’ conception of objectivity does not admit.  A narrow conception of objectivity is based on some form of mind- or human-independence.   It embodies an ‘abstraction requirement’, in that, in order to legitimate the subject matter in hand, we are required to “survey the world from a maximally abstract (i.e., dispassionate and dehumanized) vantage point…” (20)  In eschewing the narrow conception of objectivity and embracing a ‘wider’ conception for moral thought, she argues that we can say that moral judgements and thoughts can well admit of correctness and incorrectness - and hence in this sense be objective - even though such standards and forms of correctness need not be based on something outside of human thought and activity.  In her discussion of objectivity, she introduces what she means by a concept:  

In speaking here of the use of concepts, I am employing “concept” as a technical term.  In my parlance, a concept is something that determines objectively the same content in different circumstances, and, by the same token, a sound conceptual practice is one that deals in genuine, objective regularities.  Employing this terminology, we can say that it is an implication of the imposition of an abstraction requirement that the regularities constitutive of a sound conceptual practice must transcend the practice in the sense of being discernible independently of any subjective responses characteristic of us as participants in it. (21)

In rejecting the narrow conception of objectivity, she develops a view about Austin’s thoughts on language and draws on the familiar rule-following considerations from Wittgenstein and commentators.  In the latter case she emphasizes that Wittgenstein’s aim was not – and our aim following him should not be – to eschew all talk of objectivity, but rather to rethink what objectivity might be.  In doing so we can see that our concepts are essentially integrated into customs and practices that encourage the relevant sensitivities in us.
	 How do these thoughts about objectivity connect with the challenge she makes throughout to the supposed common assumption regarding moral concepts and judgements?  In brief, she labels her account of concept acquisition and use as pragmatic, in the (supposedly straightforward) sense that concepts are picked up and applied in a way that is not subject to any abstraction requirement.  There is no telling ahead of time nor external to various human interests and sensibilities, what will count as correct mastery or use of a concept.  With this in mind, she adopts a liberal view of how a concept might be employed and developed, and what we might count as correct and incorrect usage.  In doing so she emphasizes the rich network of ways in which we speak and think, that is the rich number of ways in which we might put words and thoughts to use: describing, prescribing, speaking sarcastically, thinking metaphorically, using hyperbole, and so on and so on.  With this in mind, therefore, Crary is of the opinion:

...(1) that a person’s ability to correctly project any – moral or non-moral – concept necessarily depends on her possession of a sense of the importance of similarities and differences among some set of its application and (2) that this sense of importance is (a) integral to a practical orientation toward the world that cannot help but encode a moral outlook and therefore also (b) bound to play an either more or less significant role in expressing such an outlook.  In making these allowances, we open the door for cases in which a person is correctly described as engaged in moral thought because, without regard to whether she is using moral or non-moral concepts, she is, in her use of concepts, drawing on a sense of importance that figures significantly in her moral outlook.  These are the kinds of cases I have in mind in insisting on the possibility of moral thinking apart from moral judgment-making. (44). 

We can add, then, that Crary thinks that there is no way of isolating exactly which sensibilities and ‘senses of importance’ matter morally and which do not.  So, some important such sensibilities might be formally expressed using obviously non-moral concepts, but they might still be part of moral thinking in a wider sense.  Whilst her discussions of Austin and Wittgenstein and designed to support her thoughts about objectivity, she looks to literary figures and their writings to support her liberal view of sensibilities and concepts, emphasizing that arguments, as narrowly understood by many philosophers, are not the only way in which moral change can be effected and that moral understanding can be achieved.  (There is a particularly good summary and discussion of Gilbert Ryle on Austen on this matter.)  She also considers recent work on feminist thought in this vein.




As I have said, Crary’s book is stimulating and worthwhile, particularly as it teases out the implications of the supposed assumption reasonably well.    
	However, I worry about her overall argument.  Before that, let me make a quick comment about philosophical style and taste.  A lot of Crary’s book is concerned with presenting us with a certain picture of what the moral life is and an alternate picture of her opponents.  There is a lot of ‘teasing out’ of ideas but little in the way of ‘arguments by numbered propositions’.  (Given Crary’s philosophical claims, one might have expected this.)  Hence, philosophers looking for clear-cut arguments and numbered reasons for claims, might feel somewhat frustrated.  Now, I happen to like Crary’s picture – particularly with regards to her claims about objectivity – and I am certainly not immune to the charms of philosophy that attempts to persuade in the ways that Crary does.  But, I confess to being a little frustrated at times.  And this leads to my two worries.          
	I am more than happy to concede her claims about objectivity.  But, her other key claim disturbs me more.  If we allow a wider conception of objectivity, why should we be forced to accept the liberal view that many different types of emotions and sensitivities into our moral life, things that go beyond our moral thought?  Why should we think that simply because what counts as a right, a wrong, a legitimate, an interesting, a non-standard, etc., use of a moral concept can be judged and justified only from inside the practice of evaluating, why think that this means that all sorts of emotions and sensibilities have to be in play, rather than only those that are strictly and obviously moral?  I think Crary’s intuitions are right here.  But, we are not given any distinct reason for her claim.  There seems no reason, in principle, why such an ‘internalist’ picture of evaluative justifications could not be compatible with the thought that there are certain, distinct moral sorts of emotion and sensitivities, and distinct and many) non-moral ones, and these inform their respectives types of concept alone.  Of course, one could not imagine Martian, say, being able to pick out the types of sensitivity that are relevant, but this is distinct from the present point.      
There is an obvious complaint against this sort of challenge.  Of course, there is no in principle reason why what we are offered are detailed discussions of various literary works in order to show that their moral lives, and ways of understanding them morally, depend a lot on the employment of concepts that are not straightforwardly moral.    

      

First, is she right that philosophers are pre-ocupied with moral concepts and that she is in the minority?   Hmmmm.    Even reading Ryle, many ofhis judgements in the passage she cites are moral terms
Style.





1.	The main target are those positions – of which there are many – that presume that moral thinking is confined to, and captured by, the making of judgements involving concepts that are ‘predominantly’, ‘exclusively’, ‘overtly’ moral.   That is, moral judgemnets are those that “make up one particular region of language and specifcy one particular (practical or theorectial) subject matter” (1).  Once we see that there is this presumption at work, we can see that moral outlooks – less narrowly conceived – are possible and actual, that are expressed often with concepts and language that is not narrowly moral, and doing so presents both a better picture of everyday moral thought and possibly.... other things?  Ethics is concerned with a dimension of all sorts of discourse.  (2)
  Third goal- change of view as to what counts as moral responsible agent.

10.	Part of First goal – discuss a different view of objectivity and what it is like and a distinctive mode of engagement with the world.

11ff Objectivity and internalism (not prescriptivity).  Why do we need to take seriously the charge of metaphysical strangeness?  The strength of the charge comes from a particular view of objectivity.  Broad definitions of obj and subj (definitions on p. 15).
But why should we exclude moral properties that have any taint of subjectivity about them?  What’s so wrong with that?
1.2	Discussion of absolute conception of reality etc.
	Wittgenstein, etc.  We needn’t do away with this conception of objectivity, the idea is just that it is inappropriate to ethics.
The ‘abstraction requirement’

A view of concepts as fully integrated into our practices means that they fail to deliver full-blooded objectivity and the idea of infinite rails is appropriate.

Important point (27) – some philosophers wish to reject the idea of teh abstract requirement but nevertheless assume that our subjective ideas have tobe used to get our heads round ‘genuine’ objective’ features of teh world, a la narrow conception of objectivity.  But this seems really odd aim (p. 27)

Properties – (39) “We might say that this conception positions us to understand moral judgements not as preoccupied with a special set of properties but rather as playing an intellectually respectable role in articulating an already moralized image of the world.”

1.3 – analogy of colours and ethics.  Circularity.  ‘Property’ can only merit certain attitudes.

Stuff on extension and mastery of moral concepts.  Se p. 45 for italicized thought.

1.5 – still talks of ‘moral realism’  (I would drop this.) 

Ch 2 Austin



